The evolution of security industry regulation in the European Union by Button, Mark & Stiernstedt, Peter
1 
 
The evolution of security industry regulation in the 
European Union 
Mark Button and Peter Stiernstedt 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK 
 
Word count:   7858 
Corresponding author: Peter Stiernstedt 
E-mail:   peter.stiernstedt@port.ac.uk 
Phone:   +44 7526 187852 
 
Key words 
private security, regulation, European Union, security industry, security directive 
 
Abstract 
The European private security sector has grown from a handful of small companies at the 
end of the Second World War into a multi-billion Euro industry with thousands of firms and 
millions of security staff. In Europe the demands for security is not just expressed notionally 
but also officially in The European Agenda on Security stating the European Union aims to 
ensure that people live in an area of freedom, security and justice. This paper will begin by 
exploring the role of private security in society. It will then move on to consider the main 
phases in the development of private security regulation in Europe. Following on from this 
some of the main areas of policy development will be considered, such as European bodies, 
initiatives and standards. Finally the paper will explore some of the potential op tions for the 
future in better regulating the European private security sector. From a historical perspective 
the evolution of private security regulation can be divided into three phases; the Laissez-
faire, the centrifugal and the centripetal era - each with its own distinct characteristics and 
impact on the concurrent industry. In the European Union where there is the legal 
framework for the development of a single market in services the key social partners have 
been at the forefront of developing a series of standards and guidance documents which 
promote standards across borders at the European level. However, the institutions of the 
European Union have been reluctant to intervene at a European level in setting minimum 
standards of private security regulation. Thus, the changing terrain of the European Union 
relating to security, regulation and the private security industry mean the current trajectory 
may be in need of an injection of more radical thought and consideration. 
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Literature review 
Introduction 
The European private security sector has grown from a handful of small companies at the 
end of the Second World War into a multi-billion Euro industry with thousands of firms and 
millions of security staff. Indeed the Confederation of European Security Services (COESS), 
which represents a significant part of the European manned guarding sector of the industry 
(but not all), claims to represent members covering over 60,000 security companies, 2.2 
million employees with a turnover of over €34.2 billion in 19 EU member states and a total 
of 24 countries within Europe (COESS, n.d.). The breadth of activities undertaken by the 
private security sector in the European Union also varies significantly between states, but in 
most the trajectory has been one of increasing movement towards tasks traditionally 
associated with state provided security services. Some of the functions now popularly 
undertaken in the European Union include the provision of security at major places of public 
gathering as well as the security of places of critical national infra-structure, and in some 
countries the sector even guards and transports prisoners, monitors prisoners under 
supervision with electronic tags, patrols residential streets, guards crime scenes and 
undertakes some parts of police investigations (Van Steden, 2007; CoESS, 2011; UNODC, 
2014).  
To give an idea of the proliferation of private security personnel this means a presence at 
locations such as shopping centres, leisure parks, transport hubs, pop concerts, sporting 
events; airports, government facilities, military bases, nuclear power stations, courts etc. The 
list goes on and on, resulting in daily interactions with the ordinary citizen of Europe more 
common than not. Further, in some states security staff regularly carry arms or other non-
lethal weapons (UNODC, 2014). The Weberian ‘totem’ of the state as holding the 
‘monopoly of legitimate use of force’ has been significantly cracked by the rise of private 
security. Even the ‘arms length’ control of the private security as contractors for the state has 
been accompanied with equally if not larger growth of ‘nodes’ or pockets of governance, 
beyond the state in the private and voluntary sectors, in which private security plays a 
significant part, often using ‘legitimate force’ amongst other strategies to secure compliance 
(Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Button, 2008). Such profound changes, combined with the 
increasing demands of states and citizens for greater security have stimulated both national 
and European level interest in shaping, controlling and making accountable the private 
security sector.  
In Europe the demands for security is not just expressed notionally but also officially as 
set out in the Stockholm program (2010) and then reinforced in The European Agenda on 
Security (2015) the European Union aims to ensure that people live in an area of freedom, 
security and justice. With the complex and often asymmetrical threats faced by modern 
societies this has increasingly meant the need for further synergies and cooperation at all 
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levels. The new variables of international borderless threats, the dynamic nature of 
globalisation and the ensuing decrease of importance of geographic location are changing 
the face of security worldwide. State driven security with policing, as one of its primary 
weapon of choice is no longer enough and in many Member States the private security 
industry has assumed a substantial position in the provision o f policing (Jones & Newburn, 
2006; Ocqueteau, 2006; Van Steden & Sarre, 2007; CoESS, 2011). Private security as a 
response to the recognition of globalisation as a cause for growing societal complexity 
spawning ever more intricate threat dimensions is not something entirely new. In their paper 
‘Modern Private Security: Its growth and Implications’ Shearing and Stenning (1982) 
suggested that private security was moving in the direction of a new disciplinary society and 
raised fundamental questions with respect to sovereignty, justice, and individual liberty at 
the time almost entirely unrecognized. Today the questions are certainly recognised, often 
debated and given high priority on the European political agenda. Nonetheless, inter-state 
disagreement persists and supra-national policy does not always align with national ones. 
Even less so when comparing the ambitious rhetoric with actual achievements, with a 
largely varied level of private security regulation throughout Europe (Button & Stiernstedt, 
2016).  
Despite persisting regulatory variance, since the end of the Cold War the privatisation of 
security in Europe is developing rapidly where the new security ‘fashion’ is for developed 
nations to adopt a national security doctrine with increasingly specialised police functions, 
with non-core security functions increasingly outsourced to the private market. This 
development and growth of private security has consequently also been a key factor behind 
the expansion of security industry regulation. As more and more people have come into 
contact with security personnel or become dependent on security technology, there has been 
an increasing recognition of the need for better management of these encounters and 
relationships (Prenzler & Sarre, 2012). The response itself has evolved with the growth of 
the private security industry and now includes elements of regulation, and thereby cleansing 
the market of deviant providers, to efforts to communalize by equalizing access to the 
security market. The most recent evolutionary step suggested is towards a civilizing model 
with the regulatory goals being inclusive deliberation and social solidarity (Loader & White, 
2015). Presented as a model this final step is perhaps better viewed as another smaller, yet 
not insignificant, nonetheless chronologically subsequent – both in appearance and 
implementation, piece of an increasingly fine tuned regulatory melody harmonizing 
throughout Europe.      
Notwithstanding, the private security industry to this day is continuing to grow, an 
inexorable fact that has been attributed to a wide variety of factors (Shearing & Stenning 
1982; Jones & Newburn 2006). Deliberate policies of privatising policing have no t been 
particularly significant (Prenzler & Sarre, 2012). The evolution of private security and the 
regulation thereof is a noteworthy topic and has been investigated in different regions of the 
world such as Australia (Prenzler & Sarre, 2012) and Africa (Abrahamsen & Wiliams, 2005; 
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Kasali, 2012). Also in Europe the issue is being addressed both by academics and policy 
makers (De Waard, 1999; Button, 2007a;  CoESS, 2011).  
This paper will begin by exploring the role of private security in society. It will then 
move on to consider the main phases in the development of private security regulation in 
Europe. Following on from this some of the main areas of policy development will be 
considered, such as European bodies, initiatives and standards. Finally the paper will explore 
some of the potential options for the future in better regulating the European private security 
sector.   
The role of private security in society  
The rate of growth in size of the private security sector is paralleled only by the 
concurrent expansion in role and responsibility. This inevitably leads towards an increase of 
importance (or at least relevance) of the issue, politically and practically, being elaborately 
weaved into the fabric of modern society. Currently many of the functions traditionally 
assumed by the public police are now undertaken by private security (Jones & Newburn, 
1998; Hainmuller & Lemnitzer 2003; Gimenez-Salinas, 2004; Ocueteau, 2006; Van Steden, 
2007; Button, 2007b; CoESS, 2011). Further, as recent events have shown in failing states 
when law enforcement agencies are discredited reformers turn to creating parallel private 
security structures (The Economist, 2015). Then, in a sense, completely replacing the 
traditional function of the police and state monopoly on, not only providing security but 
also, enacting force and violence.  
The sheer speed with which the private security industry is evolving puts a heavy strain 
on regulation to keep up. Although, most countries in the EU have already put in place a 
range of legal, practical and supporting mechanisms to underpin a Europe of, if nothing else, 
internal security. Some countries in the EU actually bear the hallmark of having 
implemented some of the most demanding regulatory systems in the world (Prenzler & 
Sarre, 2008; Button, 2008). Nonetheless, as many studies have shown, the systems vary 
considerably in content (De Waard, 1993; Button, 2007a; 2012; CoESS, 2011, Button & 
Stiernstedt, 2016). While covered by significantly less research the same is arguably true for 
the level of actual efficiency i.e. societal impact of the regulation or lack thereof.  
With the expansion of private security sometimes interpreted as a sign of economic 
growth and as an adjunct to more capitalistically influenced market economies. Together 
with rising crime rates often appearing in tandem with economic growth, in turn pushing for 
further expansion of the private security market both in size and reach. As always 
correlation does not imply causation but it does make for a solid argument of private 
security and the regulation thereof evolving symbiotically with society as a whole. It is and 
will remain an ever more pressing concern on all levels of Europe, national as well as 
supranational, for governments and NGOs alike. So how has the private security regulation 
evolved throughout history to its meritorious place as an integral and essential part of 
5 
 
modern society?  
Method 
An historical account of the phases of PSR from a European perspective 
Reviewing the literature available on the topic of private security regulation, the 
evolution thereof may be divided into at least three distinct phases. The extent to which 
various concepts within the discipline are adequately covered by extant literature varies 
and the diversity of sources called for a systematic methodology to map the territory. The 
method applied is informed by the rigorous system proposed by Wolfswinkel, 
Furtmueller & Wilderom (2013), assuring in-depth analysis of empirical facts and related 
insights. The five stage process of the method consists of define, search, select, analyse 
and present and can be considered as a means by which central literature and 
underpinning research can be systematically mapped out for in-depth analysis. Having 
said that, the final methodology applied does not consist of totally rigid and sequential 
analysis, but actually rather moves away from such prescriptive constructs letting the 
analytical system act as a conceptual framework within which the qualitative analysis 
resides. This allowed the interrelationships, dependencies and inconsistencies, in (and to 
some extent beyond) the particular topic to be explored. This produced a policy-piece 
type result, formulated as; from a historical perspective the evolution of private security 
regulation can be divided into three phases; the Laissez-faire, the centrifugal and the 
centripetal1 era - each with its own distinct characteristics and impact on the concurrent 
industry.  
Laissez-faire Europe 1930s to mid 1970s  
The antecedents of the private security industry can be traced back many hundreds of years 
if roles such as watchmen and locksmiths are considered (George & Button, 2000). The first 
private security companies in their modern form began to be formed in the early nineteenth 
century. The emergence and substantial growth in the private security industry, however, 
can be traced to the post-war period, particularly from the 1960s onwards (Jones & 
Newburn, 1996; George & Button, 2000). Regulation of private security, however, has some 
unexpected origins in this period. For example in both Belgium and the Netherlands 
legislation was passed in the 1930s to regulate fascist militias, which was sufficiently wide 
in scope to be used to regulate the emerging and fast growing private security sector some 
years later (De Waard & Van Der Hoek, 1991; De Waard, 1996). For most of Western 
Europe the early expansion was accompanied with industry self-regulatory measures to try 
and set and raise standards. This period was characterised by little European level interest 
with states and national private security industry groups largely pre-occupied with their own 
                                                 
1 Centrifugal denotes a force directed outward from an orbital centre as opposed to centripetal  
force directed inwards. The nomenclature is used to conceptualise and no distinction is made  
insofar that in reality centripetal force is an actual force and centrifugal force is an apparent force. 
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country and regulatory needs (De Waard & Van Der Hoek, 1991).  
Centrifugal Europe mid 1970s to early 1990s  
Rapid expansion of the private security industry, the important roles it was beginning to 
secure, along with a variety of problems associated with the sector, triggered debates in 
many countries over whether statutory regulation of some form should be introduced. Some 
states used existing statutes, not specifically designed for private security, such as the 
Netherlands (De Waard, 1999); some introduced special regulation, such as Spain (various 
laws and regulations between 1978-1981); other resisted, for ideological reasons (UK) or 
simply because the industry had not developed significantly or did not exist (Greece, Eastern 
communist states). However, from the mid 1970s and during the 1980s there were a group 
of Western European countries beginning to introduce statutory regulation. These countries, 
however, legislated according to their own needs with little reference for a common 
European approach. The forces for regulation were creating very different approaches to 
regulation of private security in the countries which were already part or destined to be part 
of the European Union (De Waard & Van Der Hoek, 1991). 
From Centrifugal to Centripetal Europe early 1990s onwards 
In 1990 the EU consisted of 12 states and of these all bar Greece, the Republic of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom had some form of regulatory system for the private security sector. 
However, in countries such as Germany regulation was based upon general trade legislation 
and was minimal. In Belgium and the Netherlands it was based upon laws designed for 
private militias and in Italy too on dated legislation from the 1940s. A report published for 
the Dutch Ministry of Justice in 1991 noted the significant variations across Europe in 
regulation, particularly upon training (De Waard & Van Der Hoek, 1991). The UK, 
Republic of Ireland, Greece were still to regulate and relied to varying extents on self-
regulatory measures. Most countries were looking towards their own regulatory needs with 
little reference to the rest of Europe. However, the report for the Dutch Ministry of Justice 
showed some countries were beginning to look at what other countries were doing and to 
consider wider European implications (De Waard & Van Der Hoek, 1991). Significant 
changes began to emerge from the early 1990s, however, with a variety of developments 
occurring which have increased the needs for greater European co-operation and 
harmonisation, shifting the force from centrifugal to centripetal.  
The creation of the European single market in the European Union unleashed the 
foundations of free movement of labour, undertakings and services within the European 
Union. The former communist countries of Eastern Europe shook off their Soviet masters, 
many enthusiastically looking to and embracing their Western neighbours ways of doing 
things and of course most eventually joining the European Union, along with some of the 
remaining Western European countries who were outside. The expansion to Eastern Europe 
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also substantially increased movement of citizens around the European Union. In the UK, 
for instance, over the last decade 2.5 million have migrated to the UK, with a significant 
proportion of these from the EU and particularly Eastern Europe (Barrett, 2014).  Indeed in 
2011 there were estimated to be almost 700,000 Poles alone who had emigrated to the UK  
(Okolski, 2014).   
Underneath these macro developments a variety of security level developments also 
emerged adding to the growing centripetal forces. Large global security companies have 
emerged operating in multiple states of the European Union: G4S, Securitas and Prosegur. 
For example G4S has over 600,000 employees operating in 110 countries throughout the 
world generating £6.4 billion of revenue (G4S, 2016). Security risks have increased 
substantially, particularly vis-à-vis terrorism, organised crime and increasingly cyber-
developments (Control Risks, 2016).  
Acting as a barrier to some of these forces have been the regulatory systems for private 
security, which at the time of writing consists of 28 EU Member States. These vary 
significantly in the standards that are applied to the private security industry. This is 
illustrated by, for example CoESS facts and figures for private security services in Europe 
(2013) providing a rating on the strictness of private security legislation for each co untry. 
Here a numerical value was allocated to each country on the basis of the answers to a 
questionnaire. Through a points allocation system five judgment criteria were devised: very 
strict2 , strict 3 , medium4 , low5 , weak or non-existent. Indicating the different levels of 
regulatory strictness on a national level. 
Along the same lines, although applying a significantly more sophisticated and detailed 
analysis, Button & Stiernstedt (2016) have also assessed the regulatory systems. Based on a 
variety of criteria drawn from guidance such as the UNODC (2014) guidance on regulation, 
the ECORYS (2011) report on security regulation as well as previous research by Button 
(2007a), amongst several others. A maximum of 100 points was possible and of the 26 states 
that were assessed the points ranged from 94/100 in Belgium to 22/100 in the Czech 
Republic. Broadly the European Union countries can be sorted according to the following 
regulator typology; super6 (75+ points), strong7  (50-74 points), weak 8  (25-49 points) and 
                                                 
2 Serbia, Hungary, Belgium, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg  
3 Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Italy, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Estonia, Lithuania, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Malta  
4 Ireland, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Bulgaria, Latvia,  Cyprus  
5 Austria, Czech Republic, Poland  
6 Belgium, Spain, Slovenia, Greece, Portugal, Sweden 
7 Ireland, Finland, Romania, Luxembourg, Germany, Malta, France, Netherlands, Estonia, Poland, 
Denmark, Latvia, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Slovakia 
8 Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Austria 
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quasi9 (24 points and below). 
This distinction is purely based upon the points achieved by the country, with those with 75 
points or more meeting the highest standards, hence ‘super regulators’, those with 50 to 74 
doing well, but not in the elite, nevertheless ‘strong regulators’. Then there are the countries 
with significant gaps in there systems and hence, ‘weak regulators’ and finally the example 
of the Czech Republic, which is so weak it could even be considered as a ‘quasi-regulator’. 
To highlight this difference a security officer in the Czech Republic has no mandatory 
number of hours of training to start working in the industry, which compares to one in 
Sweden who has to complete close to and in excess of 300 hours depending on role. 
Findings 
European organisations and their relationship with PSR 
The need to turn the tide away from the centrifugal forces was identified in the late 1980s by 
some European security organisations, which culminated in structures and organisation 
being created to push for various harmonisation related measures. This ‘turning of the tide’ 
towards centripetal forces can be traced to the formation of a number of influential European 
bodies dedicated towards lobbying European institutions for actions more favourable to the 
European security industry. Notably CoESS was formed in 1989 bringing together the 
national trade associations for the manned guarding sector in the member states and 
candidate member states. CoESS, however, was not the first such European body and was 
preceded by several more security technically focussed bodies such as EUROALARM 
(1970), EUROSAFE (1988) and ESTA (1976) and EASEM in 1987. More recently the 
European Organisation for Corporate Security (EOCS) was created in 2005 and the 
European Organisation for Security (EOS) in 2007. Some of these organisations had been 
created with a greater focus on standardisation bodies, such as EUROALARM, rather than 
the EU. In contrast, CoESS, followed some time later by EOCS and EOS, are predominantly 
orientated towards the institutions of the European Union and as will be shown has engaged 
in a wide range of activities that have contributed towards centripetal forces on regulation. 
Parallel to the employers bodies trade unions representing security officers across Europe 
had been working through UNI-Fiet (now Europa) to support centripetal initiatives. In 1991, 
for example, there was a motion to the European Parliament calling for European 
harmonisation of regulation (George & Button, 2000: 182-3).  
The turning point towards a period becoming concerned with the need for greater 
harmonisation, however, can be traced to the work of the European Commission Directorate 
General V in partnership with CoESS and Uni-Fiet conference in London in 1996, where 
COESS and UNI/Fiet signed a joint agreement on vocational training. The declaration made 
very clear the first centripetal shift of thinking amongst the key social partners in the 
                                                 
9 Czech Republic 
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European Union, stating:  
The social partners have been co-operating in a number of ways on the issue of 
vocational training. A project under the European Union's FORCE Programme was 
carried out during 1994. This European perspective provides the basis for deepening co-
operation between the social partners on the subject of vocational training. It has allowed 
the defining of common occupational profiles described in terms of the tasks which 
security operatives carry out. This provides the basis for developing a common European 
approach to vocational training in the European security industry which highlights the 
best from each national context whilst respecting the diversity in national practices and 
training structures which exist (COESS, 1996). 
This has been followed by much more work between the social partners developing joint 
declarations and standards, which will be discussed in more depth shortly. However, the 
most significant development between the social partners was in 2001 when the social 
partners signed the ‘Joint declaration of CoESS and UNI-Europa on the European 
harmonisation of legislation governing the private security sector (CoESS, 2001). The 
declaration noted the problem of, amongst others:  
National regulations differ from one another and they prevent the sector from drawing on 
the full benefits of European integration. 
And it went on ,  
…CoESS and UNI-Europa therefore call on the European ministers responsible to take 
the necessary measures so that the private security sector is governed by laws aimed at 
ensuring high quality standards and a high degree of professionalism in all countries of 
the European Union, and so that European harmonisation of the following aspects can be 
developed (authors emphasis): 
These aspects included: authorisations to practice (workers), licences (companies), 
evaluation and supervision by public authorities, professional training, health and safety, 
working conditions and the provision of cross-border services. This was a significant call for 
the institutions of the European Union to create supra-national structures to facilitate 
commons minimum standards across a wide range of areas.  
A few years later the European Union did offer a centripetal initiative for the private security 
sector, but of a deregulatory flavour which was unpalatable to most of the European security 
industry. In January 2004 the European Commission published a draft Directive with the 
aim of creating a real internal market for services. The services covered amount to around 50 
per cent of economic activity of the EU and the Directive explicitly included security 
services. The Directive fuelled much debate over the future direction of Europe. In the 
context of private security, however, CoESS opposed the Directive seeking exemption for 
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private security or significant changes to it. This rested on two concerns; first, the 
Directive’s aspiration to get rid of ‘authorisation schemes’, which would mean the licensing 
structures that exist in most countries and second the ‘country of origin’ principle, where a 
provider legally operating in one Member State could market its services in another without 
having to comply with their regulations (CoESS, 2004).  
These concerns were amplified at the time with the accession of Cyprus and the Czech 
Republic, who at that time had no or virtually no regulation. Unchanged the Directive could 
have resulted in companies from countries with lesser regulatory systems moving to those 
with higher standards and under-cutting them; returning the security sector to the old 
downward spiral in standards, which is what regulation was introduced to address in most 
countries. However, after intensive lobbying of Members of the European Parliament, by 
COESS and other organisations, the Directive was amended to exclude the security sector 
(amongst others) in a vote on the 16th February 2006 (COESS, 2006).  
European standards  
In the European Union where there is the legal framework for the development of a single 
market in services the key social partners have been at the forefront of developing a series of 
standards and guidance documents which promote standards across borders at the European 
level. The key partners: COESS (security company trade associations) and Uni-Europa 
(trade unions) have developed the following, which seek to set standards for private security 
regulators, companies and operatives across the European Union:  
 European Vocational Training Manual for Basic Guarding 1999   
 Code of Conduct and Ethics for the Private Security Sector 2003 
 Preventing Occupational Hazards in the Private Security Sector (manned guarding and 
surveillance services) 2004 
 European Educational Toolkit for three Private Security Activities 2006 
The training manual, code of conduct and educational toolkit are all voluntary standards, 
although they do carry status in many states in the EU around the creation of basic 
standards. The document on preventing occupational standards brings together much of the 
wider health and safety regulations of the EU and directs how they apply to the private 
security sector.  
European regulations  
The institutions of the European Union have been reluctant to intervene at a European level 
in setting minimum standards of private security regulation. However, the single market has 
impacted upon how some states regulate private security. There have therefore been 
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decisions in the European Court of Justice which have influenced what EU states can and 
cannot do in regulating private security. Under Articles 39 (Now 48) Articles 43 (now 49) 
and 49 (now 56) of the EU Single Market it provides for:  
 Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital: Workers  
 Freedom of Establishment  
 Freedom to Provide Services  
Several members of the European Union have sought derogations for private security 
regulation on the grounds that the sector contributes to public security, which is possible for 
activities which in themselves are directly and specifically connected with the exercise of 
official authority. However, the European Court of Justice has found this does not apply to 
security undertakings and security staff, as merely making a contribution to the maintenance 
of public security, which any individual may be called upon to do, does not constitute 
exercise of official authority (Button & Dalda, 2014).  As a consequence there are a number 
of states in the European Union which have been found not to be compliant with the single 
market regulations in their regulatory systems for private security, effectively inducing 
deregulation. These include: Spain, Italy, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium and Hungary. 
Some of the requirements which have required reform include:  
 Nationality requirements (restricting licences to one country requirement).  
 Residence requirements (requiring licence holders to live in one state).  
 Minimum share capital (requiring a minimum share capital for owners).  
 Requiring authorisation (without accepting authorisations from other Member states) 
 Licences linked to territorial area or sub-district in state, which means multiple 
licences would need to be sought to operate across a state.  
 Not recognising other states training/professional qualifications.  
 Operators must be a legal person (company), rather than individual.   
 Setting minimum standards for number of workers in undertaking.  
 Securities/guarantee must be with home country. 
 Requiring swearing oath of allegiance to home country.   
 Price approvals by local regulator.   
These illustrate that in a negative way EU institutions have been influencing the regulation 
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of private security. However, it is this framework in an enlarged European Union with 
increasing flows of workers, undertakings and services which poses a threat to the regulatory 
systems of some European Union countries. Those established and working in the lowest 
(Czech Republic) can work in the highest (Belgium). In the price driven world of private 
security purchases (Goold et. al, 2010) this opens up the possibility for the unscrupulous to 
use lower regulating countries to enter higher ranking. It provides for an advantage for those 
in lower ranking countries to use their lower standards and costs to expand into higher 
ranking. Ultimately it also undermines the ‘security blanket’ by providing holes which can 
be exploited.   
Discussion 
Coming to Terms with the Centripetal Forces: Options for the European Union  
The EU, a political creature now over 60 years old, founded on an underpinning idea of 
institutional organisation much older than that, coming to life after World War 2. Often 
attributed as the architect of the European integration project is Robert Schuman, French 
foreign minister between 1948 and 1952, who sought and brokered a consensus between the 
six founding countries. This consensus was codified in a treaty, the European Coal and Steel 
Community [ECSC] in Paris in April 1951. The idea was to put some of the responsibilities 
to a specific entity – the European Commission (at the time the high authority) – the only 
supranational institution that pursues the public interest of its constituents. Over time the 
European integration project, now known as the European Union, has expanded and been 
modified by new treaties and amendments. Most recently the Lisbon treaty represent a 
paradigm shift in the way in which the European Union developed over the years, shifting 
away from being primarily driven by an economic engine, to a more encompassing process 
including citizens in the process. Simplifying the legislative process, giving more power to 
the union, but also to the EU parliament the only institution that is directly elected. The 
central theme is to ensure democracy and transparency, particularly the legislative process 
that is arguably more transparent than the one that exists in most Member States. With the 
strict adherence to the principle of competence, where the actions of the EU heavily depends 
on the desire of the member state of actually having the EU coming up with new policies, 
the legislative harmonisation of the private security industry is absent. Moreover, with the 
EU only being able to act insofar as it has received competences of the member states, once 
the competence has been received there is still a due process to reach agreement for a new 
policy. Historically the road to any policy coordination is quite long and regulation the 
private security industry will probably not be an exception to that rule.  
 
Juxtaposed to the need for regulation of private security is the increasing integration of the 
EU and the creation of a single market. The private security industry is treated as a major 
business services sector and this is despite some attempts by Member States to secure a 
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similar status to state security apparatus (CoESS, 1998). As such the private security 
industry would be exempt from these provisions, which the state security apparatus already 
is. However, as discussed such attempts have failed, which means the private security 
industry is treated like any other business service industry and a private security company or 
operative legitimately operating in one Member State can do so in another based upon the 
home country authorisation. Some European countries have already developed very detailed 
and high quality legislation. It is these kinds of legislations and regulations that must serve 
as a basis for any future European harmonization in order to enhance the overall level of the 
industry. But national regulations are sometimes non-existent, inadequate and do not 
guarantee the professionalism the sector needs. By differing from one country to another 
they are preventing the sector from drawing on the full benefits of European integration. 
This however, requires a clear desire to have more Europe in the first place, a notion to 
which there is many perspectives and differing opinions. Adding to the complexity, even if 
the citizens of a Member State show that desire the political elite of the same country may 
be conceptually as well as ideologically against this. Because every time there is more 
Europe there is less national state – giving the political rulers something rather significant to 
lose and little to gain. Thus, unless there would be an electorate space where the leaders 
presented themselves in front of a European electorate, the supra-national politics of the EU 
is still very much an affair of nation states where national politics dominate over EU politics. 
Thus, the conditions to have a political debate must be created and stimulated, in part by 
articles like this, to if, why and how private security regulation should be European and not 
national – as the foundation for any change from a supra-national level.  
Conclusion 
The future of European private security regulation  
It is within this challenging context to which we now turn. The changing terrain of the 
European Union relating to security, regulation and the private security industry mean the 
current trajectory may be in need of an injection of more radical thought and consideration. 
A radical question might be whether a supra-national regulator for private security 
regulation is necessary for the whole European Union? On one hand this might be seen as 
the most simple solution to the new terrain, ensuring the same minimum standards across the 
European Union. On the other hand, however, such an approach would be radical, unusual 
(at least from a historical perspective) and politically disagreeable to many member states. 
Indeed even federal states such as the USA, Canada and Australia have not felt this 
necessary.  
More palatable would be a Directive that set out the basic minimum requirements for all 
Member States of the European Union. Such European level regulation has already touched 
a number of business service sectors, such as banking, insurance, air travel to name some. 
Such an approach has some precedent with what has happened in Australia relating to some 
standards for the private security sector across states and territories, where the Council of 
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Australian Governments, has sought to create greater harmonisation across the Federal states 
and territories, although with limited success (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011). A Directive could set 
basic requirements for the licensing of individuals and firms and draw out some of the 
minimum standards they should meet. Nevertheless, even this in the current politics of the 
European Union, with some states such as the UK (and others) pursuing less European level 
intervention, combined with the strains on some common security apparatus such as the 
borderless arrangements of the Schengen area would be unlikely.   
In the absence of such an initiative the current non-binding approach of building more of the 
infra-structure of European level standards and structures should be the priority for the 
policy-makers and social partners of the European private security industry. Greater 
investment in the development of common model European standards around the building 
blocks of an effective regulatory system should be developed with Member States 
encouraged and incentivised to embrace them. Such standards could include:   
 Model regulatory systems  
 Training standards for all of the common roles  
 Model licensing requirements for firms and individuals  
 Standards for significant security infra-structure, such as control rooms, training 
centres  
 Guidelines for the use of force, lethal and non-lethal violence 
 Codes of conduct and industry ethics policies  
Thus, it is the view of the authors that the most effective way to underpin more effective 
pan-European private security regulation is a Directive mandating minimum standards, 
which member states then implement. At the same time, the authors are also realistic about 
the political landscape and the acceleration of more and demanding voluntary standards is 
the most achievable and likely policy in the short and medium term in the current politics of 
the European Union.  
The European private security sector has grown into a multi-billion Euro industry with 
thousands of firms and millions of security staff. The rate of growth in size of the private 
security sector is paralleled only by the concurrent expansion in role and responsibility. This 
inevitably leads towards an increase of importance of the issue, both politically and 
practically, and also provides a notion of its being elaborately weaved into the fabric of 
modern society. Where increasing demands of states and citizens for greater security have 
stimulated both national and European level interest in shaping, controlling and making 
accountable the private security sector. Although, when comparing the ambitious rhetoric 
with actual achievements there is a highly varied level of private security regulation 
throughout Europe (Button & Stiernstedt, 2016). 
This paper has explored the role of private security in society and established that it is 
and will remain an ever more pressing concern on all levels of Europe, national as well as 
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supranational. It then moved on to consider the main phases in the development of private 
security regulation in Europe. The phases as described are the Laissez-faire Europe 1930s to 
mid 1970s followed by the Centrifugal Europe mid 1970s to early 1990s  and finally From 
Centrifugal to Centripetal Europe early 1990s onwards. Following on from this some of the 
main areas of policy development was considered. Where the institutions of the European 
Union have been reluctant to intervene at a European level in setting minimum standards of 
private security regulation. Further, those services that have been regulated have, if 
anything, effectively induced deregulation. As there are a number of states in the European 
Union which have been found not to be compliant with the single market regulat ions in their 
regulatory systems for private security. Changing this is not a simple task as, at least 
historically, the road to policy coordination is quite long and regulation the private security 
industry will probably not be an exception to that rule. With the supra-national politics of 
the EU is still being very much an affair of nation states where national politics dominate 
over EU politics. 
In conclusion the paper explored some of the potential options for the future in better 
regulating the European private security sector. Given the challenging context and perhaps 
most notably constantly changing terrain of the of the European Union relating to security, 
regulation and the private security industry mean the current trajectory may be in need of an 
injection of more radical thought and consideration. The simplest solution of a supra-
national regulator established by the European Union does not seam feasible in the short or 
mid term. Consequently the only realistic alternative is a directive that set out the basic 
minimum requirements for all Member States of the European Union. Being conscious of 
the pace of which the institutions of the European Union works, in the absence of, awaiting 
such an initiative the current non-binding approach of building more of the infra-structure of 
European level standards and structures should be the priority. The European harmonization 
of the private security services sector is the ultimate goal and the reference for any concrete 
initiative. Thus, it is the view of the authors that the most effective way to underpin more 
effective pan-European private security regulation is a Directive mandating minimum 
standards. 
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